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ABSTRACT 
This research investigates the significant differences of discretionary total accrual between ESOP 
companies and non ESOP ones as listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), and significant 
differences of stock return before and after implementing ESOP as well as the significant differences 
of stock return in every single stage of ESOP. This research was conducted on 11 companies doing the 
ESOP and other 11 ones without doing the ESOP during 1999-2004. The test is by means of windows 
period during three years before the ESOP, in the year of ESOP taking place, and in the three years 
after the ESOP. The model used for examining earnings management is the modified Jones model. The 
proxy of earnings management is discretionary total accrual and the measurement of stock price is 
stock return. This research was analyzed using independent sample t test and paired sample t test. The 
results showed that the companies as the sample in this research did the earning management 
increased their income in the period of three to two years before ESOP and increase their income in 
the period of one year before ESOP and for the following years after the ESOP. Yet, there are no 
significant differences of discretionary total accrual between these two groups. There was not any 
evidence of significant differences of stock return before and after time of ESOP and neither 
significant differences of stock return in every stage of ESOP but found that negative stock return 
occurred after and during three stages of the ESOP. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The research focuses on the crucial problem 
concerning the effectiveness of the ESOP 
(Employee Stock Ownership Program) by 
reducing the agency problem. ESOP practice 
in Indonesia will hold ESOP issuers typically 
by using the opportunities provided through 
the board of stock exchange investigation 
(Bapepam) regulations No.IX.D.4: the decree 
by the Chairman of Bapepam 
No.44/PM/1998 of additional capital without 
preemptive rights or right issue. This 
regulation states that the maximum amount 
of additional capital in the program of ESOP 
amounted to 5% of the total existing capital. 
This means that employee ownership of 
companies is too small and this will be 
smaller for the manager because ownership is 
spread not only to top level managers, but 
also to middle managers and employees 
overall. As a result, managers will still be 
open to get opportunity because the process 
of aligning the interests of agents and owners 
as one of the objectives expected from the 
holding of the ESOP can not be fulfilled. 
Another issue that emerged in the 
administration of the ESOP are granted 
options practicing the same price at grant 
(grant date). This is because the profit (gain) 
from the stock options depends on the 
difference between the price at grant and the 
price on the date of execution and the 
existence of a sufficiently during in the 
second period. Thus, the condition can come 
up with opportunistic behavior of the 
managers (Fun 2007). 
The research by the Fun in Fun (2007) 
states, that there are indications of managers 
to manage ESOP by lowering the price of the 
stock market before the date of grant-made. 
This is intended to reduce the price of their 
options and increase the future market price 
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at the date of decision. This is intended to 
maximize the profit. Fun (2007) also states 
that every stage of offering stock options has 
a significant effect on management practices.  
The management is not merely to affect 
the stock price at the grant and execution 
period, but also to make the managers’ 
performance appraisal conducted before 
granting the ESOP. Scott (2000) states that 
the plan grant of bonuses is intended to 
motivate managers to manage profit. This 
assumption is called the bonus plan 
hypothesis (bonus plan hypothesis). Yet, the 
owners can not monitor the activity that gave 
rise to the overall managers towards 
information asymmetry between owners and 
managers. This condition will in turn make 
managers increase their personal profit.  
Based on the some arguments above, 
the researcher attempts to examine more 
profoundly the issue of earning management 
related to the ESOP. In other words, it 
attempts to prove the differences in 
management practices in the period of the 
ESOP and that prior to the ESOP. The ESOP 
which is at the time of delivery or after a 
period between the companies that do ESOP 
and those that do not, as well as to see any 
difference of the profit of stock after the 
conversion to ESOP.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS  
Employee Stock Ownership Program 
(ESOP). 
Providing shares as compensation for 
managers is one way for the shareholders in 
the agency problem. By granting the shares, 
it can make the manager work through a 
program known as Employee Stock 
Ownership Programming (ESOP). ESOP is 
part of the compensation component which is 
not merely by giving the money by the 
company to the managers and employees. 
Bapepam, (2002) defines ESOP as a human 
resource management programs in the form 
of share ownership program by the workers 
who meet certain requirements in the 
company. They are the workers who have 
been working for years with the company. 
There are several ways that can be used 
in the share ownership program by the 
workers at the company. Bapepam (2002) 
divides it into several approaches: (1) 
Granting of Shares (Stock Grants), (2) By 
Employee Share Purchase Program (Direct 
Employee Stock Purchase Plans), (3) Stock 
Option Plan (Stock Option Plans), (4 ) 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) 
and (5) Phantom Stock and Stock 
Appreciation Rights (SARS). In Indonesia, 
based on the prevailing practice, the price 
exercise generally follows the provisions of 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). It is based 
on, an average, 25 day trading price on the 
stock. Yet, there are also issuers that use the 
nominal value and the decision of directors to 
determine the exercise price. ESOP can be 
done by public companies, non-public, or a 
new company that will conduct Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO).  
ESOP begins with the decision of the 
General Meeting of Shareholders (AGM) of 
the ESOP. Broadly speaking, the period of 
the ESOP can be divided in two phases: the 
planning and execution. The ESOP 
Governance stages can be seen in the Figure 
1. 
  
Figure 1 
Schema of Planning and Implementing ESOP in Indonesia 
Planning Stage                                                                Implementaion Stage 
Announcement to Public                        Conversion stage 1 I                    Conversion stage  II                     
Conversion stage III 
Conversion 
 
 
 
 
       Stockholders GM  Result /              conv. I  listing date   announcement    Con II   listing date  announcement 
                     Prospectus/Memo/                                             date                                                                   date 
                    Brochures for employees Source: Bapepam (2002)
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Management around the Period of the 
ESOP 
ESOP practice in Indonesia, the ownership of 
shares is offered by the company owners in 
ESOP ownership to a maximum of 5% of the 
total equity of the company (Regulation No. 
IX.D.4: Decree by the Chairman of Bapepam 
No.44/PM/1998). Since the ownership is 
considered small, it is difficult to expect 
managers to have motivation to reduce their 
opportunistic action. French (1987) states 
that the satisfaction of ownership by the 
workers on the job depends on corporate and 
financial incentives associated with 
ownership.  
If ownership is considered financial 
rewards, the satisfaction and commitment to 
the company will be great. The smaller the 
number of shares granted to managers, the 
lower the awards for such compensation. 
Thomson (2003) states that the new ESOP 
will be managed to provide a positive impact 
for the company only if the employees and 
managers assume that the ESOP is 
considered financial reward. 
Xiangdong and Xianming (2001) who 
examined the ESOP in China provides 
evidence that the increased value of the firm 
does not happen to a company that conducts 
the ESOP. This is due to at least the shares 
given by companies. Thus, the ESOP and 
distributed ownership shares cannot induce 
strong motivation for individuals within 
companies to improve operational 
performance. Offering ESOP to all the 
employees will induce the power of influence 
or voting rights. As a result, there is no 
correlation between individual business 
managers to improve performance so that the 
perceived intention of practicing the ESOP is 
not either useful. In other words, the ESOP 
cannot align the interests among managers 
and owners. Thus, it will not help reduce the 
manager's opportunistic actions (s 
management). 
In the ESOP, the time span between the 
date of grant (grant date) and date of 
execution (the exercise date) can cause the 
manager to do earning management. 
Opportunistic behavior can occur in two 
patterns. First, management occurs when the 
owners assess the performance of managers 
before deciding on the implementation of the 
ESOP. Furthermore, opportunistic behavior 
of managers can also occur during the period 
of the date of grant (grant date) and when the 
period of exercise date occurs. If the owner 
assesses the managers’ performance, the 
managers will try to increase the value of 
compensation for the reward. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis of a bonus 
plan (the bonus plan hypothesis) presented 
by Scott (2000). This hypothesis states that 
managers will be more motivated to manage 
profit when the company has a bonus plan  
Gumanti (2000). The reason is that because 
the profits have been used as a target in the 
process of assessing the achievement of the 
managers’ particular performance in their 
department or company in general. If income 
is one indicator that is also used to provide 
compensation to the manager then the 
manager will seek to enhance profit, the 
motivation of managers to manage profit will 
be greater too. 
The previous studies also found no 
evidence of earning management in the 
periods prior to the share grant. Shuto (2004) 
found no evidence of earning management in 
the form of increased shares by Japanese 
companies in the effort for improving profit 
and bonuses. It is true, especially, when they 
want to boost executive bonuses. This study 
supports the results of the research by Healy 
(1985) and Bebhuck and Fried (2003). 
Thus, in the period of managers’ 
performance assessment, the managers are 
expected to increase the income. The goal the 
investors will assess is the performance of 
managers and then the compensation. In this 
case, it is related to the number of shares 
granted to the managers. A research 
conducted by the Fun (2006) in Fun (2007) 
suggests that offering stock option program 
that is conducted in several stages will result 
in different effects on earning management. 
This is because the option price is determined 
at the grant date and based on 25 day average 
trading price of shares on the stock exchange. 
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 Therefore, in the period before the 
grant date, managers expect the stock price to 
decline for a while. If the price is cheap at the 
time of delivery, the price of determination 
of exercising date also get heaper. Earning 
management behavior is stronger in the first 
period but finally it get less and less in 
subsequent periods. For the period before the 
date of grant of stock options, the possibility 
of earning management by managers occurs 
in the form of decreasing income. The goal, 
with a profit decrease reported by managers, 
is the market price that is before the delivery 
period it is reduced so that the option price is 
determined based on the average value of the 
stock price which also decreases.  
Furthermore, in the period after the grant 
date, the managers expect an increase in 
stock prices in the following periods, 
especially when stock options is about to 
expire.  
The conditions are expected to be 
followed by a determination that the sale 
price rise (Fun in 2007) so that the gain will 
be higher generated. In this period, the 
managers tend to do earning management by 
increasing the income in the hope of 
increasing the profit. This then leads to an 
increase at the current price. Based on the 
description above, the hypothesis can be 
generated as the following. 
 H1: There is a difference of earning 
management practice between ESOP 
Companies that do not perform with the 
company during the period of the ESOP. 
  
Stock Price around ESOP Period. 
A research by Mehran (1999) in the NCEO a 
(2007) shows the return of corporate finance 
for two years before and in the ESOP, and 
four years after the ESOP. To view the return 
received by the shareholders, Mehran only 
considers the initial reaction at the 
announcement of ESOP. The result shows 
that 60% of ESOP companies have increased 
the stock price in the period of two days after 
the announcement of the ESOP with an 
average increase of 1.6%. Iqbal (2002) also 
found evidence that stock price increases 
because it is affected by the improvement in 
operating the performance of the company. 
Xianming and Xiangdong (2001) found 
evidence that there is no performance 
difference (including share price). This 
means that there is no difference both for 
companies that perform the ESOP and those 
that do not. Coles et.al (2005) found 
preliminary evidence of differences in stock 
prices a few days before and after 
implementation of the ESOP. Next, they also 
found any strong evidence of abnormally 
discretionary accrual in the period prior to 
the issuance of shares in the ESOP.  
This indicates that the managers manage the 
profit in the current period with the aim of 
trying to increase the gain to be received, 
expecting the price offered at the time of the 
grant date is lower than when the price on the 
date of execution. Then the expected stock 
price on execution period will tend to 
increase as a result of the efforts of managers 
to increase the value of stock options. 
Therefore, to see the difference in stock price 
in the period prior to the period after the 
ESOP and the ESOP, the hypothesis is 
formulated as the following. 
 H2A: There is difference of stock returns in 
the period of before and after the 
announcement of ESOP. 
  
Furthermore, Fun (2007) suggests the 
existence of different patterns of s 
management at each stage of the ESOP in the 
event of earning management at the first 
periods and decreases in the following 
period. This difference is caused by the 
conflicts of interest among the participants at 
the first stage and later stage. In the first 
stage, the management of profit is better 
because there is no divergence of interests. 
However, in the second phase of its strength, 
it decreases because the first stage 
participants who initially expect lower profit 
in the second phase have sought to increase 
profits by increasing corporate profits. On the 
other hand, the second party, i.e. for the 
second phase participants are still trying to 
lower the income to get cheap stock prices. 
Hypothesis 2b in this study aimed to see the 
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return of the stock between the periods of the 
ESOP. The hypothesis is formulated as the 
following. 
H2b: There is a difference between the stock 
return ESOP conversion periods  
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Research Sample. 
The sample is selected using a purposive 
random sampling, e.g., 
1. Public companies that perform in the 
ESOP during the period 1999-2004.  
This restriction is made because of 
differences in the practice of the ESOP in 
Indonesia in the period before 1999. In the 
following period of 1998, the ESOP was only 
given when the company would go public in 
the form of stock allocation. After 1998, it 
was implemented in addition to the stock 
allocation by granting permanently of 10% of 
the initial public offering, also with a 
program that is like an option program 
(Bapepam 2002).  
2. BEI did not do an IPO in a minimum 
period of three years before the ESOP. 
3. Issued financial statements during the 
observation period of research, ie from 1995 
till 2007.  
 
Types and Sources of Data 
The data were obtained from annual reports 
(annual report), and other IDX data 
publications, consisting of the following data. 
1. Public company data that has been doing 
the ESOP.  
2. Net income and cash flows from operating 
activities used to calculate the total accrual. 
3. The book value of fixed assets and 
depreciation which is used to calculate the 
PPE (Property, Plant and Equipment) gross. 
4. Total assets, total sales, and total accounts 
receivable in the period of the year before the 
announcement of the ESOP are used to 
calculate ∆ fixed assets, the value 1/TAt-1, 
sales ∆, and ∆ accounts receivable. 
5. Daily stock prices are used for the 
calculation of stock returns.  
 
Variable Measurement 
Earning management 
Earning management is measured using the 
modified Jones’ model (Dechow, 1995). This 
model uses Total Accrual (TAC), 
Discretionary Total Accrual (DTAC), and 
Nondiscretionary Total Accrual (NDTAC) 
used as a proxy for s management. Total 
accruals (TAC) are defined as the difference 
between the reported income from continuing 
operations and operating cash flows. To 
obtain the value of the DTAC it can be done 
by using the following formula.: 
TAC = Net Income (NI) - Cash Flow 
Operation (CFO) ..................( 1) 
 The total value of accrual which is estimated 
using OLS equation, as follows:  
TACt/TAt-1 = α1 (1/TAt-1) + α2 (∆ 
Salest/TAt-1) + α3 (PPEt/TAt-1) + ε....... (2) 
  
Where: 
TAt-1   = Total Asset of the period t-1 
∆ Salest  = change of net sale of the 
period t 
PPEt   = gross property, plant, and 
equipment 
α1, α 2, α3  = Regression coefficient 
ε   = error term 
 
By using regression coefficients above, (α1, 
α 2, α3) then NDTAC value can be 
calculated using the following formula. 
  
1/TAt-1 NDTAC = α1 + α2 (∆ Salest-
∆RECt) / Tat-1 + α3 (PPEt/TAt-1) + ε........... 
(3)  
Where;  
NDTAC  = Nondiscretionary Total 
Accrual 
∆RECt  = change of net account 
receivables of the period t 
α1, α 2, α3  = Regression coefficient  
ε   = error term 
DTAC is the difference between total accrual 
results for the previous period's total assets 
and a value nondiscretionary accrual. DTAC 
is calculated using the formula:  
DTAC = (TAC/TAt-1) - 
NDTAC............................ (4)  
 
Where:  
DTAC = Discretionary total accruals. 
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 Stock Return 
Return is obtained from the investment. It is 
one measurement of the company’s 
performance (Jogiyanto, 2000). Return used 
in this research is the realization of return 
(Complaints return) which is a return that has 
occurred in the period of t. Shares used for 
calculating the return can be written as the 
following. 
Rit = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
1-tP
Pt
-Pt-1 
Where: 
Rit = Company’s return i in month t 
Pt = company closing stock price on the day 
of t 
Pt-1= company closing stock price on the 
previous day (t-1). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Testing the First Hypothesis. 
The first hypothesis aims to see the attitude 
embodied in opportunistic profit 
manipulation around the ESOP. It was 
conducted by using independent sample t-
test against a company that did the ESOP 
and the ESOP did not. As a comparison, the 
companies (non-ESOP) are selected by 
means of a sample of matched firms based on 
several criteria such as (1) the company had 
not conducted the ESOP in the 1999-2004 
period, (2) the industrial firms have similar 
characteristics to the sample and the total 
equity firms in the same range. If not 
available in a single company in the same 
industry, the samples were taken in adjacent 
industries. If the value of total discretionary 
accruals between the two groups of firms 
show a significant difference, then the first 
hypothesis, which shows the differences in 
earning management between firms with 
ESOP companies do not do during the ESOP, 
it can not be rejected. 
  
Testing the Second Hypothesis 
Hypothesis H2A is done to see the 
differences in stock returns in the periods 
before and after the ESOP. This hypothesis 
was tested using paired samples of t-test 
(paired difference test) by comparing the 
stock return in the period prior to the period 
of after and before the ESOP. If there are 
significant differences from the stock returns 
before and after the announcement of the 
ESOP, then the hypothesis H2A can not be 
rejected. 
Hypothesis H2b examines differences 
among periods ESOP stock return. This 
hypothesis was tested by means of paired 
samples t-test (paired difference test) to test 
the difference between the periods of the 
ESOP stock return. If there are significant 
differences among periods of stock returns, 
the hypothesis H2b ESOP can not be 
rejected. Here is the formula. 
  
t = sd/vn
0 - x2)-(x1
 
Where: 
X1 = observation avarage 1 (Period ESOP 2) 
X2 = observation average 2 (Period ESOP 1) 
Sd = standard of deviation 
n = the sample size. 
IV. RESEARCH RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
  
Description of Research Sample 
The sample are the companies listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange that have made 
the ESOP in the period of 1999-2004 with 
the three-year observation period before 
implementation of the ESOP (1996-2001), 
when the ESOP (1999-2004), and three years 
after the implementation of ESOP (2002-
2007). The number of companies for the 
population is of 29 companies. The sample is 
taken from the period of the study using 
purposive sampling method based on the 
previously determined criteria as Table 1 (see 
Appendix 1) 
The observation was done on the 
firms that did not do the ESOP as a sample 
for comparison. The comparison sample 
(non-ESOP) was selected companies that had 
not conducted any activities during the ESOP 
1999 to 2004. Another criterion is that 
industrial firms have similar characteristics 
with the total equity in the same range. Based 
on these criteria, the total companies used as 
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the sample can be seen in Table 2 (Appendix 
2) 
 
Description of Research Variables 
It uses the variable of total discretionary 
accruals (DTAC) as a proxy of s 
management and stock return variables as a 
proxy of changes in stock prices. To provide 
a picture of total discretionary accrual 
variable (DTAC), it can be seen in Table 3 
(Appendix 3) and a description of the stock 
return is presented in Table 4 (Appendix 4). 
From the results of descriptive 
statistics, it can be seen that the average 
DTAC in the third period and two years 
before the ESOP for a company with ESOP 
shows that the pattern of earning 
management performed during this period 
can increase the income. In period of one 
year prior to and during the ESOP, one year 
to three years after the ESO, the non-ESOP 
companies perform earning management and 
they decrease the income. Such pattern is 
presented in Table 4 (Appendix 4). 
  
Hypothesis 1 Test Results and Discussion 
The first hypothesis aims to prove the 
difference between earning management with 
ESOP and those with non ESOP in the period 
during the ESOP. Therefore, the hypothesis 
is tested using different test independent t 
test. Test results of independent t test 
between ESOP companies and the non ESOP 
companies are displayed in Table 5 
(Appendix 5). 
 Different test results showed that the 
difference test between the value of 
discretionary accruals (DTAC) for a period 
of three years before the ESOP of a company 
that did the ESOP and those that did not 
show the t value is -0.453, it is not significant 
with a probability of 0.656. Negative t value 
indicates that the average value of the ESOP 
companies DTAC is lower when compared 
to the average value of DTAC for non-ESOP 
companies.  
t value for the period of two years and 
one year before the ESOP totaled to 1.288 
and 1.21. This is not significant indicating 
that for a period of two years and one year 
before the ESOP, the average value of DTAC 
ESOP companies tends to conduct less 
earning management practices than the 
companies that do not perform the ESOP. 
Different test results for a period of three 
years after the ESOP, the t value is -0.292 
and not significant, which means that for a 
period of three years after the ESOP, the 
mean average value of DTAC for a company 
with the ESOP is lower when compared to 
the average value average for companies that 
do not perform the ESOP. 
From the different test results in the 
Table 5, it can be concluded that there is no 
difference between the companies with 
ESOP and those with non ESOP. Thus, the 
first hypothesis can not be accepted. There is 
no significant difference from the practice of 
earning management performed between the 
two groups of firms. It means that managers 
in the companies with the ESOP are not 
motivated to reduce opportunistic action in 
the form of earning management. This is due 
to the offered shares in the ESOP in which it 
is maximally only 5% of the total equity of 
the company. 
  
Test of Hypothesis 2a Results and 
Discussion  
The 2a hypothesis statistical test on the stock 
return is aimed at determining whether there 
is any difference in stock returns that occur 
in the ESOP period. In this study, statistical 
test of stock return is done by using paired 
sample of t test. A statistical test of stock 
return in the period before and after the 
ESOP for hypothesis 2a is as in Table 6 
(Appendix 6). 
  From the results of paired sample t 
test, it shows that the average stock return 
for the companies with ESOP is -. 00 315 
and the t value of -0611. Negative t value 
indicates that the stock return in the period 
after the date of implementing ESOP is lower 
than stock returns after the ESOP. This is in 
line with the research by Baridwan Anwar 
(2006) who also found a negative return in 
the period after the ESOP. Stock return 
patterns during a declining supply of stock 
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options is not consistent with opportunistic 
behavior of managers that aims to increase 
the value of their options after the grant 
(Nice, 2006). This happens because a 
negative return may be caused by several 
factors, namely (1) because the option 
exercise period occurred within the time 
periods adjacent to the granting (grant date) 
the next stage in which the manager 
decreases the income patterns that occurred 
in the period before the grant date. This 
makes the financial performance decrease 
which in turn it makes the company's market 
performance lower as well.  
Such condition can result in difficulty 
for the managers to immediately increase the 
stock price in the next period and (2) the 
ESOP program implemented in several 
phases of implementation can cause the 
managers increasingly lose their power to 
influence stock prices. Significance level (α) 
is required at different test using paired 
samples t test that is 10% for two-sided test 
so that each side is of 5%. From the different 
test results, it shows no significant difference 
from the stock return for the period before 
and after the ESOP. Thus, the second 
hypothesis (H2A) is rejected. This implies 
that the rejection of H2A is the existence of 
some phases of the ESOP program. It is the 
managers’ desire to raise the price of shares 
in the first period that would directly conflict 
with the interests of managers and other 
employees who have not received stock 
options. In the reality they are still expecting 
a cheap price on the second and third periods.  
 
Hypothesis 2b 4.4 Test Results and 
Discussion 
Hypothesis 2b is expected to test the 
difference between the stock return of ESOP 
conversion period. This hypothesis was 
tested by means of different test of paired 
samples t test. The statistical test of stock 
return in the period before and after the 
ESOP for hypothesis 2b is presented in Table 
7. 
Testing the first pair is aimed to test 
the differences in stock return in the first 
period and second period of the ESOP 
conversion. From the Table 7, it can be seen 
that the average is -0.00413 and -0.00114 and 
negative t value of -1.342 and -0, 413. This 
indicates that the stock return in the first and 
second period is lower when compared to the 
return of the next period. The level of 
significance between the two periods is 0.180 
and 0.608, while the probability for the 
second pair is of 0.608 (> 5%). Thus, it can 
be concluded that thus concluded that H2b is 
not acceptable. 
This research proved the existence of 
negative returns at every stage of execution. 
This negative return is thought to be a 
continuation of negative returns in the period 
before the date of grant which is unable to 
increase on the later stages. The inability of 
managers to increase share prices between 
the period of granting and the execution is 
due to a short time span between the period 
of granting and the execution. Such a 
phenomenon causes the least time to improve 
financial performance that previously has 
been reduced (because of the income 
Decrease). In return, it influences the 
performance of company stock. Fun (2007) 
adds that the ESOP program is distributed in 
several stages in which it tends to create a 
conflict between the managers who receive 
the ESOP in the first phase, to improve the 
profits and the second and third manager who 
still lose profits. Such hypothesis is 
consistent with the theory of incentive 
contracts, which states that a new 
compensation package would be worth if the 
manager considers such incentives still  
valuable for them (Xiangdong and Xianming, 
2006). 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, 
SUGGESTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
Based on the discussion, it can be concluded 
as the following. First, managers who 
conduct ESOP are not motivated to reduce 
opportunistic behavior. Secondly, this 
implies that there is no difference between 
the earning management by companies that 
implement the ESOP and those that do not. 
Thirdly, for a period of three years before the 
ESOP, the practice of earning management 
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occurs in the form of the increased income. 
Conversely, in the period of the year before 
the ESOP up to three years after the ESOP, 
the practice of earning management occurs in 
the form of decreased income. 
 Hypotheses 2a and 2b could not 
provide any evidence that shows a significant 
difference between the stock returns. Yet, the 
researchers have found evidence of negative 
stock returns in the periods before and after 
the ESOP. This indicates that the ESOP 
program is offered with a maximum of 5% of 
the total equity of the company as required 
by Bapepam (2002), but it did not provide 
motivation for managers and employees to 
improve company performance. 
Implications and Further Research 
Suggestions  
First, the companies are expected to consider 
a period of time (the grant date and exercise 
date) in which the ESOP policy by 
considering the period to provide an 
opportunity for managers to improve 
corporate financial performance and for 
investors to consider and process the 
information from these ESOP programs. 
Second, the Bapepam is expected to 
reconsider the rules on the percentage of 
shares which is given to the managers or 
employees in the ESOP, so that it can 
encourage managers to better improve the 
performance affecting the company's stock 
price. 
It is suggested that, for further 
research, the researchers are expected to test 
in advance what factors that affect the 
company's decision to implement the ESOP. 
In addition, they are also expected to increase 
the size of the sample and extend the 
observation time so that it can induce a wider 
generalization. Finally, they also examine the 
company's motivation in doing the ESOP and 
test the effect of it on companies’ 
performance (EPS and PER) in the future and 
the effect of the ESOP to the agency problem 
as well. 
Research Limitations 
First of all, the sample using the companies 
consists of only eleven companies doing the 
ESOP and the other eleven ones no doing the 
ESOP. Secondly, windows- 25 day period is 
relatively a short span of time between the 
period of the grant date and the exercise 
period (exercise date) in which it is close to 
the limited time the researchers extend the 
observation windows. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1 
Data of Research Sampling 
Criteria ∑ 
Companies doing  ESOP in the period of 1999-2004 29 
Companies that do not comply with the criteria: 
• Doing IPO less than three years before observation 
• Doing merger during observation 
• Without information for the date giving and implementing ESOP on financial report 
• Data of incomplete financial report  
 
10 
1 
2 
5 
Total of the sample 11
Source: processed secondary data 
 
Appendix 2 
Table 2 
List of the Companies for the Research Sample  
Year  ESOP Non ESOP 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
- 
3 
5 
3 
- 
- 
- 
3 
5 
3 
- 
- 
Jumlah 11 11 
      Source: processed secondary data 
 
Appendix 3 
Table 3 
Descriptive Analysis of the Value DTAC  
the ESOP Companies’ and Non ESOP Companies 
 ESOP NON ESOP
N Min Max Averag
e 
Std. 
Dev 
Min Max Averag
e 
Std. Dev 
DTAC-3 (3 years before 
ESOP) 
11 -.36 3.02 
 
.2558 .93139 -1.08 9.83 .6806 3.07934 
 
DTAC-2 (2 years before 
ESOP) 
11 -.12 
 
.27 
 
.0339 
 
.12490 
 
-1.20 
 
.70 -.2335 .65817 
DTAC-1 (1 year before ESOP) 11 -.33 .17 -.0218 .12254 -9.58 .71 -1.079 2.86708
DTAC0 ( during ESOP) 11 -.38 
 
.11 -.0750 .15294 -17.37 .99 -1.732 5.21718 
DTAC+1 (1 year after ESOP) 11 -.29 .11 -.0389 .14634 -.90 .82 -.197 .47478 
DTAC+2 (2 years after ESOP) 11 -.39 
 
.25 
 
-.0017 .17095 -.79 .83 -.165 .46308 
DTAC+3 (3 years after  
ESOP) 
11 -.66 
 
.15 
 
-.1078 
 
.24103 
 
-1.37 
 
.93 
 
-.0553 
 
.68100 
 
Source: processed  secondary data  
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Appendix 4 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Stock return  
 
 N Minimum Maximum  Average Standard Dev. 
Hypothesis 2a 
   Ret Before 
   Ret After 
Hypothesis 2b 
Ret pair 1 
   Ret Period 1 
   Ret Period2 
Ret pair 2 
   Ret Period 2 
   Ret Period 3 
 
275 
275 
 
 
500 
500 
 
350 
350 
 
-1,00 
-0,22 
 
 
-1.00 
-0,22 
 
-0,11 
-0,18 
 
0,35 
0,17 
 
 
0,22 
0,17 
 
0,14 
0,27 
 
-0,8072 
-0,35 
 
 
-0.0036 
0,0006 
 
0,0009 
0,0020 
 
1,49299 
0,07473 
 
 
0,05878 
0,03668 
 
0,03475 
0,04124 
Source: processed secondary data (2008) 
 
Appendix 5 
Table 5 
df Testing of the  DTAC Value of  ESOP Companies  
and the Non ESOP Companies 
ESOP-Non ESOP 
Levine’s Test T-Test 
F Significanc
e 
t Sig.2-tailed 
DTAC-3 (3 years before ESOP) 2,181 0,155 -0,453 0,656 
DTAC-2 (2 years before SOP) 19,505 0,000 1,288 0.212 
DTAC-1 (1 year before ESOP 4,436 0,048 1,210 0.241 
DTAC0 (Period during ESOP 4,419 0,048 1,045 0.309 
DTAC+1 (period 1year after    ESOP) 3,89 0,063 0,998 0.338 
DTAC+2 (period 2 years After ESOP ESOP) 3,46 0,078 1,042 0.317 
DTAC+3 (period of  3 years after  ESOP) 4,175 0,054 -0,292 0.775 
         Source: processed secondary data 
 
Apendix 6 
Table 6 
df Testing of  Paired Sample T Test for Hypothesis s 2a 
 
 Mean t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
After - Before -.00315 -.611 274 .542 
                       Source: Processed secondary data 
 
Appendix 7 
Table 7 
df Testing of  Paired Sample T Test for Hypothesis 2b 
 
 Mean t df Sig.(2-tailed) 
Period 1-Period 2 -.00413 -1.342 499 .180 
Period 2-Period 3 -.00114 -.413 349 .680 
                        Source: processed secondary data 
 
 
